The final months of the current Duma’s work as it gears up for parliamentary elections in December have revealed the festering sores of Russian politics. Everyone knew they were there, but preferred not to talk about them and tried to keep their unsightliness from view. The infections eating into the Russian political system haven’t changed – the ongoing antagonism between the "Petersburg" and "Family" clans, the conflict between the security people (siloviky) and the oligarchs and the total corruption. This latter has created a shadow power system based on individual influence that is far more effective in the way it functions than the official network of ties between state institutions.

Many thought it a logical-enough scenario that President Vladimir Putin and his allies would let things be until the next presidential elections and, then, armed with a new four-year term, would set about cleaning up the summits of power. But, no, the wait proved too much, and none of the rival groups proved ready to bury the hatchet for a few months more.

One of the heads of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, the so-called "oligarchs’ trade union," said privately that the siloviky, driven by their own power and financial ambitions, had decided to go for broke, taking advantage of the election-campaign chaos to force the old Yeltsin-era elite out of power and business and, in the process, "putting Putin in an awkward situation." The same source added that reports of former Yukos head Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s political ambitions were far from being mere invention. By subsidizing various political forces from democratic parties and single-seat candidates to the Communists, Khodorkovsky was just a step away from ensuring his own "majority" in the Duma.

But there is no point now in quibbling about who started the whole thing. The main thing about this conflict is that it is a fight to the death. It began looking like a standoff between Yukos and the Prosecutor General’s Office, but it is now drawing more and more players into its orbit, and the blows are being dealt with ever-growing ferocity. There remains one big question, however – what is Putin’s role in all of this?

The conflict reached a peak with Khodorkovsky’s arrest at the end of October. A day later, meeting with the cabinet, Putin crossed the Rubicon, so to speak, and publicly made it known that he was aware of everything that was going on. He also added quite unambiguously that it would be better not to attempt to take the side of businessmen under criminal investigation. Given that none other than Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov had criticized the Prosecutor General’s Office on several occasions, Putin’s warning set the tension crackling. Three days later, Alexander Voloshin, like Kasyanov a member of the "Family" clan, resigned as head of the Presidential Administration and was replaced by his deputy, former St. Petersburg lawyer Dmitry Medvedev.

One aspect of these battles that gets little attention is the fact that Putin is catastrophically lacking a qualified and effective political team of his own. He essentially writes his own speeches and has no authoritative backup person to help give him room to maneuver, if only in his public comments. The risk of covert sabotage by the government or by individual ministers is very high, and he cannot guarantee support even from the state-run media.

Putin’s rivals, meanwhile, are busy organizing themselves. One of the leading national newspapers recently printed an appeal to all sections of the democratic public to rally behind an alternative candidate to Putin in the March 2004 presidential elections and at least try to prevent him from winning in the first round.

Of course, political ambitions also play their role here. Sources in the "oligarch camp" say there are two main contenders for alternative candidate to Putin. One is Unified Energy Systems (UES) boss Anatoly Chubais, and the other is Khodorkovsky, who no longer runs Yukos, having been replaced by Semyon Kukes, but occupies instead a prison cell at the Matrosskaya Tishina prison. Chubais’ supporters say that prison is too great an obstacle for Khodorkovsky to be considered as a serious candidate, while Kho-dorkovsky’s backers say that, far from being a disadvantage, languishing in prison could serve Khodorkovsky well, as Russians always like the underdog.

In an effort to consolidate the democratic camp, Chubais launched a new appeal for Yabloko to join forces with the Union of Right Forces (SPS). Given that nothing has changed in the uneasy relations between Yabloko leader Grigory Yavlinsky and SPS leaders, the move is more a promotional tactic by Chubais than a real chance for the democrats to form a union. But now that Voloshin has left the Kremlin, his brilliant talent for intrigue and cunning moves is on the market, and this makes the situation that much more unpredictable. A hint at what possibilities for surprise still remain was the unlikely plot in the Federation Council against Putin appointee Sergei Mironov immediately following Voloshin’s resignation.

As for the seemingly pro-Putin camp, they have so far demonstrated a lack of strategic planning and normal co-ordination of their actions. They still lack the most important thing of all – a clear general idea and set of principles. So far, they have come up with no more than hints and significant silences wrapped in lavish bouquets of empty words and slogans, but the time has come for them to define exactly what they want to be, make it public, look for supporters, reassure the anxious and pin down who their clear adversaries are. This is a move that would require political will and intellectual and information resources. The sooner Putin makes this move, the less room to maneuver he gives his adversaries. But not to take this step is to let the initiative slip from his hands. This is risky because, first, the points to be scored would go instead to his adversaries’ tally, and second, because he risks losing his value as a pillar of strength in the eyes of his supporters.