Peace, the cynics say, is but a brief respite from war. The phrase could turn out to be an all too accurate description of the peace that followed the end of the Cold War.

Almost seven years ago, the presidents of Russia and the United States solemnly declared that their countries were no longer adversaries. Then, in 1997, came the Russia-NATO Founding Act, which intended to usher in a new era of security cooperation between Russia and the West.

But since then, the global military and political circumstances have changed significantly, prompting Kremlin strategists to re-examine their security policies and establish a new military doctrine for the country.

Two weeks ago, the Security Council adopted a draft national security program, and the Defense Ministry submitted a draft military doctrine to the Kremlin.

The current national security policy was approved by the president in December 1997, and the Main Provisions of the Military Doctrine were published in 1993.

So what events in particular have shaped Russia's new security outlook?

Deputy Secretary of the Security Council and head of the team that drafted the new national security blueprint, General Sherstyuk cited NATO military operations in Yugoslavia and the worsening situation in and around Chechnya as key factors underlying the review of Russia's national security.

The new military doctrine is presented in language designed to clarify the perceived threats Russia faces today. Its authors write of a "conflict between two trends." They mean, on the one hand, a world dominated by a single superpower relying on military superiority to resolve key global policy issues, and on the other hand, the concept of a multipolar world. Clearly a reference to the United States and to the countries that would oppose its dominance.

Among principal threats to Russia's security, the authors of the new military doctrine name "military buildup around Russia's borders, the borders of its allies and adjacent seas." Expansion of military blocs and alliances is considered another potential threat - a reference to NATO's recent enlargement eastwards. Even events in Chechnya are interpreted in a geostrategic context, the perceived threat being not so much Chechen separatism as international terrorism.

Russia's previous security doctrine interpreted potential threats as being of a nonmilitary nature - the social and economic hardships of the transition period appeared more menacing at that time. But the new doctrine anticipates the country facing primarily a military threat and suggests military solutions in response. This all smacks of Cold War-era thinking.

The West, however, has also done its bit to convince Moscow that today, as in decades past, force alone rules the world. Their approach to negotiations has all too often suggested that diplomatic agreements are good only when backed by vast numbers of warheads and tanks. The West, after all, was far more considerate toward the hostile Soviet Union than toward the more loyal Russia.

It is enough to recall how NATO ignored Russia's repeated statements against the use of force in Yugoslavia, thus violating the NATO-Russia Founding Act that calls for consultations between the two parties in the event of a crisis situation in Europe.

Then followed the blunt interview given by U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen to The Washington Post, saying the United States would abandon the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty unless Russia agrees to "modify it." The "modification" in question would allow the United States to deploy a missile-defense system covering its entire territory. In other words, Russia is being asked to accept U.S. nuclear superiority.

But however justified these concerns, Russia should remember that fighting on two fronts is a great strain. It should not allow disputes with the West to interfere while it's in the midst of fighting a real, not just potential, adversary at home. The Chechens, though not named directly in the new doctrine, are designated Russia's No. 1 security threat.

The experience in Chechnya clearly demonstrates the need for a mobile army of volunteers. Already, contract soldiers are replacing conscripts in the Caucasus. But financial constraints will remain an obstacle to building up military strength where it's needed.

Stepping up military competition with the West would require even greater numbers of soldiers. For the top brass, this would be a welcome strategy, enabling them to retain their jobs and effectively kill all talk of army reform.

Implementing the new doctrine would also have the effect of splitting and rendering ineffective the extra funds allocated for purchasing new weapons. The Defense Ministry has been arguing for numerous years that the state should not waste money on producing piecework, but should focus on mass production.

In turn, arms producers have displayed nothing but patriotic rhetoric with which to oppose the cost-efficiency logic. The new military doctrine, however, will provide them with plenty of arguments in favor of producing a full range of military hardware.

But experience reveals that draft documents should not always be taken too seriously. They serve as little more than references for citation by various lobby groups and have more in common with Soviet-era Communist Party Congress resolutions.

Nonetheless, that documents of this nature can emerge at all indicates a changing wind in Moscow. The Russian leadership is perhaps not yet preparing for another Cold War, but psychologically, it certainly looks ready for a Cold Peace.

(Alexander Golts is a writer for Itogi magazine.)