A senior Russian official, who hasn't lost his influence today, once said to me that the next president of Russia would be the man who either refuses IMF loans or puts oligarch Boris Berezovsky in prison.

It was autumn 1998 – Boris Yeltsin was still president, Yevgeny Primakov was prime minister, and Russia had just gone through the GKO default and devaluation of the ruble.

Vladimir Putin didn't need to resort to these sensational public relations moves to get elected president. By the time presidential elections came round, the need for International Monetary Fund money had dwindled all by itself thanks to rising oil and gas prices. As for Boris Berezovsky, he himself says that if Putin should see a need to put him in prison, he'll do so.

Berezovsky clearly sees the issue of whether or not to arrest him as something the authorities would decide acting on purely political motives. This interpretation is preferable for Berezovsky but doesn't insure him against potential "interest" from the law-enforcement agencies.

It's not a tradition in Russia to take the people at the top at their word. This is why no one – not ordinary people, not the West, not the oligarchs – really believed Putin when he said the oligarchs had to be kept at "equal distance" from power. Likewise, no one really believed him when he said that he would not allow any more "fishing in muddy waters." And no one believed Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, who said that oligarchs had lost their immunity.

Public reaction has focused mostly around two versions so far – that the Kremlin seeks total control of financial flows, and that the authorities want to put inconvenient oligarchs in their places.

Following the first version, Putin wants to build a sort of single-state corporation that would leave no room for large private business. Kremlin-friendly businessmen would be invited to manage various sectors. This differs little from the Soviet model, the difference being that current authorities will pay more attention to making the economy effective.

As for the inconvenient oligarchs of the second type, these include Vladimir Gusinsky (Media-MOST), Vladimir Potanin (Norilsk Nickel), Vagit Alekperov (LUKoil), Rem Vyakhirev (Gazprom), Vladimir Kadannikov (AvtoVAZ) and Anatoly Chubais (RAO UES). Supporters of this version note that oligarchs closer to the Kremlin such as Berezovsky, Roman Abramovich (Sibneft), Pyotr Aven and Mikhail Fridman (Alpha group), haven't had any problems yet from the tax or law-enforcement agencies. Another oligarch who hasn't yet had any problems, Mikhail Khodorkovsky (Yukos), is being warned that he will be next.

These attacks on the oligarchs could mean that for once, the authorities' words and actions are coinciding. If this is so, then both versions lose their meaning. The same goes for the round-table between business and the authorities organized by Boris Nemtsov. This is because the conflict is not between business and the authorities but between individual businessmen or companies and the law.

It's worth noting another two thoughts from the president and the prime minister. A few days ago, Kasyanov said that not all Russian laws had always been good, but that didn't free anyone from having to abide by them. Putin added to this thought: "The main thing is not that the punishment be harsh, but that it be irreversible."

But enforcing punishment is the thing that could give the authorities the most difficulty. Finding reasons to punish is the easy part. The oligarchs didn't imagine that they would someday have problems with the law and, to a greater or lesser extent, interpreted it very loosely as they built up their capital.

LUKoil – Alekperov's powerful and successful oil empire – is perhaps the best example. The state and other companies knew that LUKoil exported oil to Belarus and Ukraine through its authorized firms, thus saving on export duties. Even the newspapers were writing about this scheme. The company got away with it for a long time, but last week, the tax police started investigations for tax evasion. And there are plenty of known charges that could be laid at the feet of other industrial giants.

While many political experts and politicians think that Putin won't be able to renounce his ties with the people and connections who brought him to power – Yeltsin's entourage, "the Family," Berezovsky, Abramovich and so on. But it looks like he has already done so, hence the political hysteria whipped up by Berezovsky of late. It's just that everything has to be done in its own time.